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ABSTRACT
Just-in-time return-oriented programming (JIT-ROP) is a powerful
memory corruption attack that bypasses various forms of code
randomization. Execute-only memory (XOM) can potentially pre-
vent these attacks, but requires source code. In contrast, destructive
code reads (DCR) provide a trade-off between security and legacy
compatibility. The common belief is that DCR provides strong pro-
tection if combined with a high-entropy code randomization.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we demonstrate
that DCR can be bypassed regardless of the underlying code ran-
domization scheme. To this end, we show novel, generic attacks that
infer the code layout for highly randomized program code. Second,
we present the design and implementation of BGDX (Byte-Granular
DCR and XOM), a novel mitigation technique that protects legacy
binaries against code inference attacks. BGDX enforces memory
permissions on a byte-granular level allowing us to combine DCR
and XOM for legacy, off-the-shelf binaries. Our evaluation shows
that BGDX is not only effective, but highly efficient, imposing only
a geometric mean performance overhead of 3.95 % on SPEC.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Code-reuse attacks constitute a powerful exploitation technique
that is intensively used to subvert the control flow of modern soft-
ware [8, 18, 35, 44]. These attacks exploit program bugs to redirect
the program’s control flow to existing but unintended code se-
quences. Defending against these attacks has become a hot topic of
research. The main defense techniques can be roughly categorized
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in proposals for control-flow integrity [2], code randomization [34],
and code-pointer integrity [33]. We consider code randomization
schemes which randomize the code layout of applications at differ-
ent granularity, i. e., by randomizing base addresses of programmod-
ules [48], register assignments [39], the order of functions [31] and
basic blocks [15, 49], or even the location of each instruction [25].
Recent research demonstrates that code randomization schemes
are vulnerable to sophisticated memory disclosure attacks: just-in-
time return-oriented programming (JIT-ROP) dynamically reads
large portions of randomized code memory. To mitigate these at-
tacks the concept of execute-only memory (XOM) [5, 13, 14, 20] has
been proposed. XOM denies any read access to program memory
and thereby prevents a JIT-ROP attack from inferring the random-
ized code layout. However, deploying XOM in practice requires
to precisely separate intermixed code and data to avoid program
crashes. In general, this is impossible for binary executables [4, 32].
As such, recent XOM schemes like XnR [5] and Readactor [13, 14]
require source code leaving legacy software unprotected. To over-
come these challenges, the concept of destructive code reads (DCR)
was introduced [47, 50]. The key idea is to prevent the attacker
from executing code she has read before to thwart conventional
JIT-ROP attacks.
However, recent attacks against DCR [46] reveal the feasibility of
code inference attacks if the underlying code randomization scheme
offers low entropy. Further, DCR is ineffective if program code is not
freshly randomized per load, e. g., an attacker can read—and thereby
destroy—a program module, then re-load it to exploit the fresh and
intact version. So far, these attacks exploit implementation pitfalls
and security trade-offs of the underlying randomization scheme. In
other words, DCR coupled with load-time randomization and code
randomization at a finer granularity (e. g., [7, 15, 25, 49]) is believed
to resist these attacks [46, 47].
Contributions. In this paper, we first demonstrate the contrary:
DCR is ineffective even when load-time randomization and fine-
grained code randomization are in-place. Our novel code inference
attacks allow the attacker to disclose highly randomized code frag-
ments without actually reading them. The key idea behind our at-
tacks is to perform targeted memory reads of only a small fraction
of the memory to deduce many other randomized code fragments.
Second, we propose BGDX, a novel defense mechanism that can
protect commercial off-the-shelf and legacy binaries against JIT-
ROP attacks, including the aforementioned code inference attacks.
Our defense is based on the following observation: while perfect
code and data separation for legacy binaries is in general an unde-
cidable problem [4, 32], the majority of program code and data can
be reliably confirmed as either code or data. That is, most program
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code can be protected by XOM, whereas the remaining program
parts can be protected by DCR. Similar to existing XOM-schemes
such as Readactor [13], we leverage Intel’s recent virtualization
extension called EPT (extended page tables) to manage memory
access rights. However, EPT enforces memory access rights on the
granularity of 4KB pages. As a consequence, an entire page needs
to be protected with DCR if only a couple of bytes are not distin-
guishable. To reduce the DCR attack surface to a minimum, we
developed a new byte-granular memory permission system on top
of EPT, which supports read-only, execute-only and DCR protection
on a single page. As we will show, BGDX significantly limits code
inference attacks since most of the code memory is not readable,
i. e., memory probing will almost certainly crash the program.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We question the common belief that DCR [47, 50] is an ef-
fective defense against code-reuse attacks. In contrast to pre-
vious DCR attacks [46], we demonstrate that DCR coupled
with strong code randomization is insecure, by implementing
novel, generic code inference attacks for recent versions of
Firefox (32 bit) and Internet Explorer (64 bit).
• We show how to conceptually bypass DCR regardless of
the underlying code randomization scheme by combining a
novel variant of code inference with whole-function reuse.
We provide a proof-of-concept exploit against a recent ver-
sion of Firefox (32 bit) and gathered data suggesting that this
attack is feasible against Internet Explorer (64 bit).
• We propose a novel defensive scheme called Byte-Granular
DCR andXOM (BGDX) which protects legacy binaries against
state-of-the-art code inference attacks based on a novel byte-
granular permission system.
• We implement a prototype of BGDX and test its effective-
ness with our attacks. BGDX imposes a geometric mean
performance overhead of only 3.95 % on the SPEC 2006 CPU
benchmarks and 7.9 % on common browser benchmarks.
2 PROBLEM SETTING
Destructive code reads (DCR) prevent the execution of code that
has been read previously [47, 50] to thwart JIT-ROP attacks [45]. An
overview on DCR is depicted in Figure 1: first, binary instrumenta-
tion techniques are leveraged to randomize the program binary (❶)
before it is loaded into program memory❷. Hence, an attacker can-
not predict the location of code she aims to utilize in a code-reuse
attack, and needs to resort to a JIT-ROP attack.
DCR distinguishes between a code and a data view on a pro-
gram’s code section. As a result, DCR does not need to separate
data embedded in the code section thereby not requiring the pro-
gram’s source code. Whenever DCR observes a data fetch in the
code section, DCR garbles the fetched byte in the code view with
an invalid opcode, e. g., in Figure 1, the attacker reads code block C1
in ❸, and DCR immediately garbles the block in ❹. Hence, though
the attacker disclosed the randomized content of C1, she cannot
re-use this code as it has been garbled.
To preserve the program’s functionality, DCR needs to support
legitimate reads on data embedded in code memory. To do so, the
values garbled in the code view are preserved in the data view in❺.
Thus, for subsequent read accesses, DCR returns the original bytes
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Figure 1: Overview of destructive code reads (DCR).
rather than the invalid opcodes. E. g., the read access in Figure 1,
to the legitimate embedded data block D4 in ❻ results in garbling
the code block in ❼, but later reading attempts of D4 are correctly
handled via the stored value in ❽.
2.1 Existing DCR Attacks
Snow et al. [46] recently introduced first attacks against DCR. How-
ever, as we will argue in the following, these attacks have limited
impact as they only exploit implementation pitfalls and mostly
violate the assumptions of DCR implementations. In particular, the
DCR implementation Heisenbyte (Assumptions, p. 3) [47] states:
“Load-time fine-grained ASLR: [...] we require code lay-
outs to be randomized at a fine granularity so that the
registers [39] used and instruction locations within a
function [31] or basic block [49] are different."
Note that altered instruction locations within a function or basic
block are required. Thus, a scheme providing altered instruction
locations within a function, but not within basic blocks, is sufficient
to fulfill this requirement. However, Snow et al. [46] assume a
weak code randomization scheme [39] that (1) performs in-place
transformations, i. e., does not alter offsets between the module base
and individual functions or basic blocks and (2) does not perform
code randomization every time a module is loaded. Given these
relaxed assumptions, the following attacks are feasible:
(1) Code cloning abuses a just-in-time compiler to create identi-
cal copies of a code region. Now, the attacker can disclose
gadgets of one copy, but execute those of the second copy.
(2) Code reloading allows to first disclose the code of a shared
library and, upon reload, invoke gadgets in the fresh copy.
(3) Disclosing a few bytes allows to reveal the code randomiza-
tion of close-by gadgets.
With proper load-time randomization in place, code cloning and
code reloading are prevented since the code is newly randomized on
load. The remaining code inference attack exploits the narrow scope
of the performed code transformations. As mentioned, Heisenbyte
requires transformations with a wider scope [31, 49].
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In other words, DCR coupled with a code randomization scheme
that offers high entropy and randomizes application code per load
(e. g., [15, 25, 49]) resists the attacks described by Snow et al. [46].
However, in this paper, we go beyond attacking potential DCR
implementation pitfalls, but explore generic code inference attacks
that work in the presence of highly randomized code.
2.2 Adversary Model
Our adversary model is in line with previous code reuse research,
like JIT-ROP [45], DCR defense [47, 50] and load-time code random-
ization [15, 49]. Our defense intends to prevent code-reuse attacks,
specifically JIT-ROP and code inference attacks. I. e., data-only at-
tacks [10, 30] or using side-channels to deducememory content [43]
is beyond the scope of this work.
Known binary. The attacker has a copy of the original binary
(before the randomization is applied). We assume that this binary
is not heavily obfuscated, such that functions, the call graph, the
control-flow graphs, and gadget locations can be derived reliably.
Memory disclosure vulnerability. The binary has a repeatedly
exploitable, byte-granular memory disclosure vulnerability which
enables the attacker to read from any address in readable memory.
Control-flow hijacking. The binary suffers from a memory
corruption vulnerability allowing the attacker to alter writable
memory containing control data such as function pointers, virtual
function table pointers, and return addresses.
Execution context. The attacker has access to an execution
engine to repeatedly issue memory reads and analyze disclosed
memory regions. Modern applications, e. g., web browsers and PDF
viewers, often provide such execution contexts via scripting lan-
guages like JavaScript or Flash.
Destructive code reads. Code which has been read causes the
program to crash when it is executed at a later point in time due to
the presence of a destructive code read defense (see Section 2).
Randomization with high entropy. A fine-grained load-time
code randomization is applied. Details of the randomization are
given separately for our attacks presented in Section 4 and 5.
Conditions for successful exploitation. We deem an attack
successful if the attacker can execute code of her choice in the
context of the attacked process. Since modern systems enforce data
execution prevention (DEP), the attacker has to leverage code-reuse
attack techniques. To successfully execute a code-reuse attack in the
presence of destructive code reads, the attacker must take care not
to (1) read any byte of the gadgets invoked during the code-reuse
attack, (2) execute any byte that the process has previously read,
and (3) read any byte that the process invokes during execution.
3 HIGH-LEVEL ATTACK STRATEGY
In the following, we provide a high-level overview of our two
novel attacks to bypass DCR schemes. This demonstrates general
limitations of DCR and we argue that this concept provides no
viable defense in the long run.
Our first attack assumes a code randomization based on shuf-
fled basic blocks and registers. This allows to deduce a program
location from leaked content at that location. Thus, only an initial
leak of the application’s image base is required. Considering the
code randomization, this supposedly should not aid the attacker.
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Figure 2: Basic workflow of our DCR bypass.
In contrast, the second attack overcomes stronger code random-
ization, incorporating the full range of instruction transformations
and shuffled parameter sequences, but requires leaking a sufficient
number of code pointers.
Recall that DCR assumes that code has to be read in order to be
used as a gadget. To bypass DCR, the attacker has to find suitable
gadgets while reading only code which is not executed—especially
the gadgets themselves must be missed purposefully.
To prepare the attack, the attacker analyzes the original binary.
In particular, she extracts the call graph, the control-flow graph and
gadgets. The attacker also extracts occurring bit patterns which
will not be modified by later code randomization. E. g., when the
registers of an instruction are permuted, only the bits encoding
the register will change, while the remaining bits will stay intact.
During the attack, these bit patterns provide important hints to
help deduce which basic block is mapped to the probed location.
The actual attack has four distinct phases: (1) finding code an-
chors, (2) path-guided code re-discovery, (3) gadget setup, and (4) ex-
ecuting the code-reuse attack.
Figure 2 illustrates these phases. For reference, the top-left sub-
figure shows six basic blocks (A-F) of the original program memory.
Each basic block contains different byte sequences. With the shape
of a byte sequence (□, △,⃝), we depict parts which are left intact by
the code randomization, i. e., the shape will stay recognizable. Note
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that a shape can be empty or filled to represent different manifesta-
tions of code randomization, e. g., changed register-encoding bits
due to randomized register allocation. Basic block C is highlighted
since it contains a gadget the attacker aims to use.
The top-right subfigure shows the program memory after code
randomization: the locations of the basic blocks are randomized,
and the fill-state of the shapes is inverted to denote a different
manifestation of the code randomization. When beginning the
attack, the shapes are shown with a question mark (?), because
the fill-state of a shape is initially unknown to the attacker.
The first phase of our attack is concerned with finding a partial
mapping between code fragments in the randomized process mem-
ory and the corresponding location in the original binary. We call
such a mapping a code anchor. To find a code anchor, the attacker
randomly probes the memory. E. g., the first probe in Figure 2 re-
veals a shape sequence which the attacker knows to occur multiple
times in the program memory ❶. Thus, it fails to uniquely identify
a location. In contrast, the second probe ❷ succeeds: the revealed
sequence only occurs in basic block D. The unique shape sequence
tells the attacker that the probed location corresponds to one exact
location in the original binary, i. e., she just found a code anchor. In
Section 4, we provide empirical evidence showing that code anchors
can be found with high probability with only a few probes.
In the second phase, we use these code anchors to perform a
path-guided code re-discovery to deduce the locations of code which
the attacker aims to leverage in her code-reuse attack (i. e., basic
block C in Figure 2). We proceed in this fashion to minimize the
amount of memory we have to read, as this minimizes the chance of
DCR terminating the process, while simultaneously maximizing the
chance to leave gadgets intact for later use. In Figure 2, the attacker
traverses the path D→ A→ B→ C known from the original bi-
nary by reading the basic blocks’ terminating instructions (❸,❹) to
deduce the location of the gadget in basic blockC (❺). Note that this
algorithm is target-oriented, i. e., it searches for one specific gadget.
This fundamentally distinguishes it from the dynamic discovery of
code pages in the original JIT-ROP attack [45].
Depending on the randomization scheme, the attacker may know
which semantic code is present at a certain location, but may not
know the syntactic details of that code fragment. For example, ran-
domized registers (see Section 4) or parameter sequences (see Sec-
tion 5) may demand a gadget setup to find out which registers or
which parameter sequences are used, respectively—all without read-
ing the actual code fragment. In step ❻ the attacker reads basic
block B, which precedes the targeted basic block C. Given that
code randomization must preserve the continuous flow of data
of the original program, the randomization of basic block C usu-
ally depends on the randomization used in basic block B. Thus, by
comparing the randomized basic block to the basic block from the
original binary, the attacker can trace the data flow, and can thereby
deduce the randomization used in the targeted basic block (❼). Note
that the targeted basic block C has not been read and is therefore
not garbled due to a destructive code read.
Once the gadget locations and all information to invoke them
are known, executing the ROP chain in phase 4 is straightforward.
3.1 Minimizing Probed Memory
In presence of DCR, every probed byte poses the risk to termi-
nate the process when it is executed later on. Thus, we face the
challenge to minimize the amount of memory we have to read. To
tackle this problem, we use what we call a code anchor. A code
anchor maps the location of a code fragment (addressor iд ) in the
original binary to the corresponding location in the randomized
process (addressrand ). Furthermore, we leverage the control flow
of the original binary. Even in a randomized process, a basic block’s
successors can usually be determined reliably by analyzing its ter-
minator instruction, which allows us to follow the control flow in
a forward direction.
Listing 1 shows the basic approach of the path-guided code re-
discovery: first, we discover a path p from the target code t (e. g.,
basic block C in Figure 2) to an address in the original binary, for
which we know the location in the randomized binary (line 7). For
this, we use standard graph algorithms on the original binary’s
control-flow graph and call graph. Starting at the first basic block
of the path p, we disassemble its terminator to determine the suc-
cessors in the control flow (line 14). With those, we follow the
equivalent edge in the control flow of the randomized process
(line 18). I. e., if the path p in the original binary follows the true
edge of a branch, we follow the true edge as well. We repeat this,
node by node, until we reach the end of the path. At this point, we
have determined the address of the target code’s basic block in the
randomized process without reading it.
3.2 Testbed for the Attacks
We assume Windows 7 as the target operating system. There are
no substantial reasons as to why our attacks or defense could not
be applied to Linux; we simply chose to match the platform used
for the Heisenbyte system. We target a recent version of the Fire-
fox browser v44.0.2 and Internet Explorer 11, because browsers
are a popular choice for memory-corruption attacks. In our at-
tacks, we leverage their main C++ libraries, xul.dll respectively
mshtml.dll, because they offer a large code base and also feature
a large number of virtual functions (i. e., addresses that are prone to
be leaked). Since both libraries come with debug information, we
can use the IDA Pro disassembler [1] to obtain a reliable disassem-
bly, including the control-flow graphs, the call graph, boundaries
of basic blocks, and gadget locations.
Furthermore, we backported the vulnerability CVE-2014-1513 [38]
which skipped certain checks regarding the length and the current
state of a JavaScript array. With some engineering, this vulnera-
bility provides an arbitrary read/write primitive, which not only
allows us to probe memory, but also to divert the control flow.
Since there is no DCR system with code randomization publicly
available1, we simulate its effects. Note that this simulated testbed is
used only for evaluating our attacks, but is not used for our defense
scheme proposed in Section 6.
Simulating destructive code reads. To evaluate our attacks,
we have to determine whether an attack succeeded. Thus, we use
DynamoRIO [28] to dynamically instrument the browsers so that
we can compare executed memory locations with the ones read
1 While the authors of NEAR [50] published its source code, it does not include a code
randomization scheme.
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Listing 1: Path-guided code re-discovery.
1 Inpu t : Code anchor : addressor iд 7→ addressrand
2 Ta rge t code : t , a d d r e s s in the o r i g i n a l b i n a ry
3 CFG of the o r i g i n a l b i n a ry : cf д
4 Output : Address o f the t a r g e t code in the randomized p r o c e s s
5 // Use CFG to find a path between the target code and the code anchor.
6 p : = f i n d _p a t h (cf д , addressor iд , t ) )
7 // Starting at the code anchor in the randomized process ...
8 cur : = addressrand
9 while (p != ∅ ) :
10 // disassemble enough of the current basic block to determine its successors.
11 succs : = g e t _ s u c c e s s o r s (cur )
12 // Follow the equivalent edge , according to the predetermined path.
13 // E.\,g., if the path followed a true -edge , follow the true -edge here , too.
14 cur : = f o l l ow_ e qu i v a l e n t _ e d g e ( succs , p . pop ( ) )
15 // At the path's end , we reached the randomized basic block containing the target code.
16 return cur
during the attack: if they are mutually exclusive, the attackers ROP
chain executes successfully.
Simulating randomization schemes. Given that implement-
ing a code randomization scheme is not a trivial task, we opted to
simulate its effects using a custom oracle to answer the attacker’s
leaking attempts. In particular, we perform transformations like
shuffling the basic block sequence, but return random data, e. g.,
for register-encoding bits. This actually overestimates the effects
of the code randomization, as the attacker receives data which is
less useful for deducing other code fragments.
4 DCR BYPASS OF RANDOMIZED REGISTERS
AND BASIC BLOCK LOCATIONS
For our first attack, we assume a load-time randomization scheme
in which the register assignment is permutated, and each basic
block is placed at a random location. Since this alters the instruc-
tion locations within a function, this scenario fully satisfies the
requirements stated by Heisenbyte. It also resembles a stronger ran-
domization scheme than the instances actually deployed in current
commodity operating systems and also stronger than the schemes
considered in previously published attacks [46].
This attack essentially probes the application’s executable mem-
ory to deduce program locations from the probed memory. It as-
sumes that the image base can be leaked. Note that this supposedly
does not aid the attacker, since no gadget in the process should
be in the same location due to the code randomization. Unlike our
second attack, which requires leaked function pointers, this attack
targets a wider range of applications, namely those, which do not
stem from C++ or otherwise feature a lot of function pointers.
Phase 1: Finding Code Anchors. First, we need to find code
anchors. To do so, the attacker probes a few consecutive bytes from
a random location in code memory. Recall that she does not know,
which basic block the code randomization mapped to the probed
location. However, she does know the content of the basic blocks
from the original binary. Thus, every disclosed byte can be seen as
a constraint on the possible basic blocks at that location. In other
words, the original basic blocks form a template the leaked bytes
have to match. Due to register assignment randomization, the bits
encoding a register in an instruction are initially unknown to the
attacker. Since the location of these register encoding bits can be
extracted from the original binary, we can introduce gaps in the
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Figure 3: Number of candidates in xul.dll for a randomly
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templates for those bits. Consider Step ❷ in Figure 2: the attacker
discloses the byte sequence (△,▲). Only the template ( ? , ? ), where
the ? denotes the gaps due to register encoding bits, from basic
block D matches this constraint.
To determine how discriminative a leaked sequence of bytes is,
we sampled 50,000 random byte sequences of three to eight bytes
from xul.dll and counted how often this sequence occurs in the
library (see Figure 3). One also has to take into account that the
leaked sequencemight overlap a basic block boundary. Naturally, an
m-byte sequence can appear 1+n−m times in an n-byte basic block,
as the lastm − 1 start positions have to be excluded. Considering
the basic block sizes in the program (see Appendix A), one can
calculate the chances for a leakedm-byte sequence not to overlap
basic block boundaries (see Table 1). Since the considered browsers
do not execute large portions of their code (see Appendix B), there
is only a marginal risk for the attacker to crash the application by
reading code the application executes.
Example for a six-byte sequence. A six-byte sequence is unique
with a chance of roughly 40 % (see Figure 3). With a chance of 75 %,
it does not overlap a basic block boundary (see Table 1). Conse-
quently, there is a 30 % chance (40 % · 75 %) to know the location of
the leaked sequence in the original program. Thus, one can expect
to find a code anchor after leaking only four six-byte sequences
(
⌈ 1
30 %
⌉
= 4).
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Table 1: Chance for a randomly sampled n-byte sequence to
not overlap basic block boundaries in xul.dll.
n 4 5 6 7 8
Chance 83.9 % 78.9 % 74.3 % 69.9 % 65.9 %
Table 3: Statistics for themain libraries of the web browsers.
xul.dll mshtml.dll
Number of basic blocks 1,601,390 793,527
Portion of data bytes 1.62% 2.39%
Number of gadgets 1,641,199 689,891
Portion of gapless gadgets 11.24% 8.97%
Phase 2: Finding (Gapless) Gadgets. In our experiments, we
used Ropper [41] to locate gadgets in the original binary and dy-
namically generate a ROP chain. We chose a ROP chain with eight
gadgets invoking VirtualAlloc() to facilitate further code injec-
tion. Note that the gadget locations are for the original binary, but
are unknown for the randomized process.
Thus, these gadgets are target code in the notation of our path-
guided code re-discovery algorithm from Listing 1, which the at-
tacker can then simply invoke to infer the addresses of the gad-
gets in the randomized process. In the large binaries xul.dll and
mshtml.dll, we had no problems to construct a ROP chain from
the gadgets reachable from found code anchors.
Table 2: Example for gapless gadgets. The contained gadget
is pop ebx; ret (5b c3) in all three cases. Bytes encoding a
register are bold, while gadgets are boxed.
Hexadecimal Disassembly Gapless
5b c3 pop ebx; ret ✗
31 5b c3 xor [ebx-0x3d], ebx ✗
b8 00 5b c3 00 mov eax, 0x005bc300 ✓
In Section 3, we described the Gadget Setup the attacker has to
perform to “fill the gaps” in the gadgets she wants to use. However,
randomization schemes without instruction-level randomization
beside register randomization, allow to omit this phase, if the at-
tacker uses only gapless gadgets (see Table 2 for an example). We
call a gadget gapless if it does not contain bits that encode a source
or destination register of the original (and correctly aligned) instruc-
tion. Table 3 shows that roughly 10% of the gadgets are gapless,
which leaves ten thousands of gapless gadgets for the attacker to
choose from.
Phase 3: (Optional) Gadget Setup. The values in the gaps (the
used registers) can be derived by looking at the data flow. From the
original binary, she knows which values flow into which instruc-
tions. Thus, she can usually infer the used registers, and thereby
the gaps, used in the next instructions from the ones she observes
to be used upstream. However, due to the large attack surface in
the considered complex binaries, we did not implement this step.
Phase 4: Execution. We constructed a ROP chain for the ran-
domized process, but we still have to show that no gadget was
garbled by DCR. Discovering code anchors demands only a few
disclosed bytes, the code re-discovery algorithm destroys only the
terminators which occur on a path between the code anchor and the
target gadget, and the gadget setup destroys only code preceding
the target gadget. Thus, the target gadgets are still intact, and allow
us to exploit the program.
5 DCR BYPASS OF RANDOMIZED INSTRUC-
TIONS AND PARAMETER SEQUENCES
In addition to shuffled basic block locations and registers, we now
consider stronger randomization schemes which invasively trans-
form the code in each basic block beyond (syntactic) recognition,
e. g., insert NOPs, substitute instructions for equivalent ones, or
change the sequence of instructions. This effectively thwarts lo-
cating a single gadget with certainty, except probably for certain
edge cases. One could, however, use more coarse-grained code frag-
ments as gadgets: whole basic blocks or even whole functions. As
the latter would reduce attacks basically to a return-to-libc [9] at-
tack, we additionally allow the randomization scheme to change
the sequence of parameters for functions at load time to harden the
system against function-reuse attacks. In practice, such randomized
parameter sequences would be restricted to non-exported functions
and would be hard to implement reliably for binaries.
In contrast to our first attack, this attack thwarts stronger code
randomization, but at the price of an additional assumption: It
assumes that a sufficient number of function pointers can be leaked.
In practice however, this assumption is not hard to satisfy. Large
C++ applications provide hundreds of function pointers through
virtual function tables and it has been shown that other applications
also make heavy use of function pointers, e. g., as callbacks [17].
Phase 1: Finding Code Anchors. In this attack, we leak a num-
ber of function pointers to serve as code anchors. To do so, we
leak an object that is located at a fixed offset relative to the initial
memory error and use the object’s virtual function table pointer to
compute the module’s base address. Ultimately, this allows us to
harvest all virtual function tables [42] to gain many code anchors.
Phase 2: Finding Call Sites. The code randomization must pre-
serve a function’s semantics. However, while we can use whole
functions as gadgets, knowing a function’s location is not sufficient
to invoke it due to the randomized parameter sequences. We tackle
this problem by leveraging our path-guided code re-discovery algo-
rithm to find a call site for each gadget function we aim to reuse.
Phase 3: Reverse Engineering Parameter Sequences. Next,
we read and disassemble the call sites of our gadget functions. Uti-
lizing knowledge about the data flow in the call site’s function from
the original binary, we determine the sequence of the arguments
at the call site. We deem an argument’s position to be deducible
if we can trace it to a data source which does not originate from
the parameters of the call site’s function as those were random-
ized as well. Effectively, this allows to reverse engineer the gadget
function’s randomized parameter sequence.
Our function chain consists of nsProcess and RunProcess. The
former constructs the object and has no parameters, the latter
creates a process. The crucial argument for RunProcess is my_argv,
which contains the command line of the to-be-created process. Its
first array element is initialized with the return value of the function
ToNewUTF8String. Thus, we can deduce the position of my_argv
by backtracing the data-flow from the call-site RunProcess to the
call-site of ToNewUTF8String.
Phase 4: Execution. We gathered code anchors by leaking func-
tion pointers without reading code memory. Since we analyzed the
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call site functions, but not the gadget functions, we did not read any
memory we plan to execute. According to Appendix B, there is only
little code executed by the process, so we can easily choose call site
functions the process does not execute. Thus, our code-reuse chain
is not garbled by DCR and we can successfully exploit the process.
6 BGDX: BYTE-GRANULAR DCR AND XOM
Execute-only memory (XOM) has become an important primitive
for defensive research and is vital for the resilience of, e. g., Readac-
tor [13, 14]. While XOM has gained adoption for source code-based
solutions, it remains a challenge to transfer it to binary-compatible
schemes. Destructive code reads offer binary-compatibility, but, as
we have shown, cannot fully prevent code inference attacks. We
now present BGDX (Byte-Granular DCR and XOM), our defensive
scheme that leverages byte-granular memory permissions to pro-
tect legacy binaries against code inference attacks. Figure 4 shows
BGDX’s three main components: first, the Profiling performs static
and optionally dynamic analysis on the to-be-protected binary to
determine which bytes in executable memory are code, data or
uncertain. Identified code and data bytes are marked in the code-
bitmap and data-bitmap, respectively. Uncertain bytes are protected
by a DCR policy, so that the profiler can operate conservatively and
thereby avoid incorrectly identified bytes. Note that a relatively
small percentage of identified code bytes is sufficient for BGDX
to be effective and the threshold can easily be reached through
conservative static analysis or dynamic analysis, as we show in
Section 8.3. Second, Code Randomization eliminates static relative
offsets and randomizes parameter sequences of internally used func-
tions to hinder whole-function reuse. Finally, Memory Permission
Enforcement ensures that each byte in the code section is protected
in accordance with the profiling results. The byte granularity is
preserved regardless of the placement of identified code and data
bytes as well as unidentified bytes.
6.1 Profiling
For our static profiler component, we extended the IDA Pro disas-
sembler [1] with heuristics to increase code coverage and exclude
identified code that has a low confidence. First, we parse the exe-
cutable file format and harvest code pointers to serve as starting
points for the subsequent code discovery. Indirect control-flow
transfers are resolved conservatively to avoid false positives during
code discovery. The next step iterates over discovered code and
tries to compute the address of as many memory reads as possi-
ble. Bytes in code sections that are targeted by memory reads are
marked as data. Discovered code is marked as code. The output
of the static analysis consists of two bitmaps for each executable
section of the binary, one bitmap for the discovered code and the
other for discovered data. The static analysis is optimized for high
confidence of recovered code and data bytes rather than coverage.
We wanted to avoid falsely identified code bytes at all costs, because
they may cause legitimate memory reads to crash. Similarly, incor-
rectly recovered data bytes may cause legitimate code execution
to crash the program. For the general case static analysis is not
perfect and may introduce false positives. In Section 8.3 we show
that the degree of code coverage achieved with static analysis alone
is sufficient to thwart code inference attacks.
Our dynamic profiler component is based on the instrumenta-
tion framework DynamoRIO [28]. During profiling, we record all
instructions and mark the instruction bytes as code. Furthermore,
we intercept each memory read and use its source address to re-
solve the corresponding module and section. Memory reads that
do not target any executable section of the examined binary are ig-
nored. Bytes in code sections that are targeted by memory reads are
marked as data bytes. The binary can be executed on benchmarks
or test benches during profiling in order to increase coverage.
The selection of profiling methods can be adjusted in accordance
with the requirements of the present use case. Static analysis pro-
duces good code coverage, but detects only few data bytes. Further,
it cannot be completely ruled out that careful and conservative
static analysis introduces false positives. In contrast, dynamic anal-
ysis has less code coverage, but can detect more data reads and
introduces no false positives. Dynamic profiling allows to create
perfect, although not complete, bitmaps. Thus, it is suited to setup
BGDX completely fail-safe for COTS binaries. Static and dynamic
analysis results of the same binary can easily be merged to comple-
ment one another. Conflicts should occur rarely and can be resolved
by marking the byte in question as uncertain. In the end, the profiler
incorporates the profiling results into the binary file’s executable
file format.
6.2 Code Randomization
Similar to existing DCR schemes [47, 50], we assume a code ran-
domization component that randomizes the code of the binary
each time it is loaded and adapts the profiling data accordingly.
We assume the following three properties: first, the location of all
basic blocks is randomized. Second, the instruction locations within
a basic block are randomized. Third, the parameter sequences of
internally used functions are randomized.
6.3 Memory Permission Enforcement
Our memory permission enforcement component supports the
following three policies that can be applied on a byte-granular level:
(1) read-only, (2) execute-only and (3) destructive code read.
The profiling data is utilized to protect each byte of the code sec-
tions accordingly to Table 4. Discovered code is protected execute-
only, which is also the default memory permission for code pages.
Thus, instruction fetches are not interrupted, which is the key fac-
tor for efficiency. Data fetches to code pages are interrupted and
BGDX looks up the permissions of the byte(s). If an execute-only
byte is fetched as data BGDX immediately terminates the program.
To achieve byte granularity for read-only and DCR policies
BGDX duplicates the physical pages containing such bytes, es-
sentially creating code and data views. Identified data bytes are
garbled in the code view at load-time to prevent their execution.
However, data fetches to data bytes are permitted and accomplished
by redirection to the data view. Uncertain bytes are protected by
the DCR policy which means that they are initially intact in both
views. Data fetches to DCR bytes succeed analogous to read-only
bytes, but additionally the corresponding bytes are garbled in the
code view on-the-fly in order to prevent their subsequent execution.
DCR bytes can be executed analogous to execute-only bytes, until
they are garbled in the code view by data fetches. Section 7 gives
further implementation details of our BGDX prototype.
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Figure 4: Workflow of BGDX, our proposed scheme to prevent JIT-ROP and code inference attacks.
Table 4: Enforced policies, their encoding in the profiling
metadata and the system’s actions when instruction and
data fetches occur.
Policy Profiling Metadata Meaning Event Action
Code-Bit Data-Bit
XOM 1 0 Code-Byte IF1 ✓
DF2 ✗
RO 0 1 Data-Byte IF1 ✗
DF2 ✓
DCR 0 0 Uncertain IF1 ✓/✗
DF2 ✓
Instruction fetch1, Data fetch2
In terms of security, there are two key differences between BGDX
and the original DCR implementations [47, 50]. First, the attacker
cannot execute legitimate data in code memory, such as jump ta-
bles, if they have been identified during profiling. Data may contain
exotic and lucrative gadgets due to their different nature than code,
so BGDX further reduces the attack surface. However, the second
effect is much more important, as it severely impedes code infer-
ence attacks: random illegitimate memory reads targeting the code
section have an inherent probability to hit execute-only protected
bytes, which results in immediate program termination. Since code
inference attacks need many such probes, this significantly reduces
the probability of successful exploitation, as we will show in Sec-
tion 8.3. An attacker may try to leverage code pointers to avoid blind
probing. However, BGDX also leverages all accessible code pointers
during profiling, so that code reachable through code pointers is
protected execute-only and thereby useless for code inference.
7 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section, we cover implementation details of our prototype
implementation of BGDX. Our memory permission enforcement
component leverages existing virtualization technology. Hypervi-
sors rely on SLAT (Second Level Address Translation) in order to
map physical pages of the guest system to physical pages of the
host system. Intel’s hardware-assisted implementation of SLAT is
called EPT (Extended Page Tables), which we leverage to enforce
the different byte-granular memory permissions shown in Table 4.
Normally, the EPT contains a 1:1 mapping of guest physical pages
to host physical pages. Windows On-Demand Paging causes virtual
pages to be mapped only after they are touched the first time. This
initial page access causes a page-not-present fault which is handled
by the kernel’s page fault handler. The memory management then
maps the appropriate physical page at the faulting address. We
augment the page fault handler to call into the hypervisor to create
a shadow page and point the EPT entry of the guest physical page
to the host physical address of the shadow page. Additionally, we
set the permissions of the shadow page to execute-only in the EPT
entry. Essentially, this creates separate data and code views for the
same page, as used by the DCR implementations (see Figure 1 in
Section 2). During on-demand paging, our hypervisor overwrites
the code view of bytesmarked as read-only in the profilingmetadata
with INT 3 instructions, which enforces the read-only policy by
preventing the bytes from being executed. Note that the original
bytes are still intact in the data view. Due to the EPT setup and the
permissions of the code view, instruction fetches do not raise page
faults or EPT faults, which is a key element for efficiency.
However, data fetches do cause EPT faults, which direct control
to our modified page fault handler in the hypervisor. There, we
disassemble the faulting instruction to get the operand size and
the number of bytes of the attempted read. The profiling metadata
of each byte is checked in order to detect attempts to read a code
byte, as such reads violate the XOM policy and must therefore
result in process termination. Bytes marked as data or uncertain
are allowed to be read. Otherwise, we point the EPT entry to the
data view to enable legitimate data fetches. Additionally, if a read
byte is marked as neither code nor data, the DCR policy is applied,
and we overwrite the byte with INT 3 instructions in the code view.
Lastly, by utilizing the single-step flag, we redirect the EPT entry
to the execute-only view to facilitate fast instruction fetches before
returning control to the instruction which caused the data fetch.
8 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our prototype implementation of BGDX
with regards to performance and security. All experiments were
executed inside a virtual machine running Windows 7 on an Intel
Core i7-2640M @ 2.8GHz with 8 GB DDR3-RAM @ 1600MHz.
8.1 Benchmarks
First, we evaluate the performance overhead introduced by our
defense system. To this end, we used the SPEC CPU 2006 Integer
Benchmark Suite [24].
However, two of the benchmarks (403.gcc and 462.libquantum)
did not compile using the default configuration. The first one uses
variables beginning with two underscores, which is reserved for
compiler use in MSVC.2 The second one requires complex arith-
metic functions, which are not supported by MSVC, despite the fact
2https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2e6a4at9.aspx
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Table 5: Runtime overhead for the SPEC 2006 Benchmarks.
Benchmarks marked with † are not supported onWindows.
Benchmark Overhead Benchmark Overhead
400.perlbench † 458.sjeng 5.58 %
401.bzip2 4.53 % 462.libquantum †
403.gcc † 464.h264ref 4.53 %
429.mcf 7.21 % 471.omnetpp 0.76 %
445.gobmk 6.25 % 473.astar 4.06 %
456.hmmer 3.75 % 999.specrand 3.85 %
that they are specified in the C99-standard. The SPEC2006-FAQ
explicitly mentions that this benchmark is problematic.3 However,
the SPEC2006 System Requirements explicitly states in section
I.A.2 that other compilers, like MinGW, are not recommended.4 A
third benchmark (400.perlbench) does compile, but attempts to
access member fields which are internal onWindows, and therefore
crashes when executed on the supplied test inputs. Again, this is a
known problem,5 and while there is a patch available, it refuses to
work on the specific version of SPEC available to us. Note that these
three problems are not caused by our system, but by the Windows
environment which is only partially supported by SPEC.
On the remaining nine benchmarks, we achieved a geometric
mean overhead of 3.95 % with a median of 4.53% and a worst-case
of 7.21% (see Table 5). These benchmarks are computationally in-
tensive, and we therefore deem our system to induce a minimal
overhead in practice.
8.2 Firefox Browser Benchmarks
In addition, we applied our system to the Firefox browser and used
popular browser benchmarks to demonstrate a more realistic work-
load. In particular, we used Speedometer [27], Peacekeeper [29],
and JetStream [26]:
• The Speedometer benchmark provides the number of repeti-
tions per minute for typical browser interactions powered by
different JavaScript frameworks. While the baseline Firefox
performed, on average (arithmetic mean) 28.6 runs/min, the
secured version performed only 26.1 runs/min. This corre-
sponds to an overhead of 9.57 %.
• The JetStream benchmark performs a series of computation
heavy operations, as they would occur in different phases
of feature-rich web-applications. For each benchmark, it
reports so-called “scores”, where higher scores are better.
Ultimately, it calculates an overall-score using the geomet-
ric mean. The baseline Firefox had a score of 105.57, while
JetStream reported a score of 88.319 for the secured version.
Since these scores loosely correspond to consumed time, we
estimate an overhead of 16.34 %.
• The Peacekeeper benchmark also aggregate a series of smaller
benchmarks. However, only the ones performing computer
graphic computations and reporting Frames per Second (FPS)
have a linear relation to consumed time. Those average to
an overhead of 3.16 %.
3https://www.spec.org/cpu2006/Docs/faq.html
4https://www.spec.org/cpu2006/Docs/system-requirements.html
5https://www.spec.org/cpu2006/src.alt/
Given that every benchmark-suite has its own scoring system, it
is hard to give an overall result. Our best estimation is an aggrega-
tion to a geometric mean overhead of 7.9 %, with a median of 9.57 %.
Nevertheless, these benchmarks confirm that BGDX’s overhead is
moderate in practice for complex, real-world applications such as a
web browser.
8.3 Security Considerations
To bypass DCR, the attacker exploits that code memory is readable
to infer the location of gadgets. In contrast to Heisenbyte [47], every
byte confirmed as code reduces BGDX’s attack surface, since a read
attempt of confirmed code immediately crashes the application.
Memory probing. The attacker is reduced to random probing
for two reasons: first, because the load-time code randomization
invalidates prior knowledge about code locations. Second, because
traversing the control-flow graph is mostly prohibited, since easily
traceable control-flow transitions also increase the defender’s code-
coverage, which in turn increases the ratio of XOM-protected bytes.
Successful attack. Given that an imperfect code coverage re-
sults in a probabilistic defense, we deem an attack to be successful,
if enough gadgets for a ROP chain can be gathered at least once in
a billion tries, i. e., the attacker’s chance of success is at least 10−12.
To evaluate BGDX’s security, we have to estimate the number of
necessary random probing attempts. Current ROP defenses[12, 40]
assume that a ROP chain needs at least eight gadgets, but a recent
ROP defense bypass [23] took special care to construct a ROP chain
with only five gadgets. Thus, we assume here that a ROP chain
needs only five gadgets. Gadgets are divided into classes [39] to
distinguish their different tasks. However, these classes are not
distributed equally, and the attacker needs gadgets from different
classes. A Monte-Carlo simulation using a published gadget dis-
tribution [39] revealed that an attacker needs to find on average
37.2 random gadgets to gather one of each necessary class. Taking
into account that code randomization leaves on average only about
33 % of the gadgets in a class intact [39], the number of tries has
to be multiplied by 3.3. Table 3 shows that there is roughly one
gadget per basic block and we have shown in Section 4 that an
attacker needs about 3.3 random probes to find a code anchor at
basic block level. To favor the attacker’s odds, we assume that a
code anchor immediately identifies the gadget in the basic block
without further probes or gadget setup. However, taking the basic
blocks’ sizes into account (see Appendix A), roughly 57% of the
gadgets are destroyed by probing, assuming that a gadget has at
least two bytes and that a probe destroys at least three bytes. Thus,
the number of necessary tries has to be multiplied by 2.3. Due to
the shuffling of basic blocks, the execute-only protected code as
well as the gadgets are close to uniformly distributed in the process
memory. Thus, a conservative estimation of the number of random
probing attempts yields: 37 · 3 · 3 · 2 = 666
This results in a (1 − p)666 chance of success, with p being the
ratio of bytes protected by XOM. Figure 5 shows that the ratio of a
priori identified code bytes can be as low as 5% and still prevent
the attacker from carrying out the necessary probes. That is, even
a 5% code coverage reduces the attacker’s chance of a successful
code inference attack to less than 10−12.
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Achievable code coverage. To estimate realistically achievable
code coverage, we executed the JetStream [26] and Peacekeeper [29]
browser benchmarks. Together, they executed 540,068 of 1,601,390
basic blocks for Firefox’s xul.dll, which corresponds to roughly
33% code coverage. This analysis took only a few minutes and is
easily repeatable. However, given that there is debug information
available for both Firefox and Internet Explorer, their static analysis
leads to almost perfect code coverage. Table 6 also shows that exe-
cuting even the small test sets accompanying the SPEC benchmark
can achieve a substantial code coverage.
Summary. We have shown that the practically achievable code
coverage on binaries is sufficient to limit the number of probing
attempts to a level, which reduces the chances of a code infer-
ence attack to practically zero (see Section 8.3). Thus, unlike DCR,
BGDX prevents sophisticated code inference attacks. Together with
randomized parameter sequences, it can further prevent whole-
function ROP. Since it imposes only a small overhead (see Sec-
tion 8.1), does not demand to perfectly separate code from data, and
can protect binaries without access to source code or debug informa-
tion, it can efficiently protect legacy binaries. Table 7 summarizes
these results, showing that BGDX unites the security benefits of
XOM with the legacy binary compatibility of DCR.
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Figure 5: Number of probing attempts a the attacker can
make before his success probability sinks to 10−12, given the
ratio r of XOM-protected bytes in code memory. The graph
uses the formula (1 − p)a = 10−12.
9 DISCUSSION
We now discuss our results and open challenges.
Simulated attack environment. There is no implementation
of a DCR system with a fine-grained code randomization publicly
available, so we had to simulate both to test our attacks. As for DCR,
logging data and instruction fetches allows to precisely evaluate
whether exploitation has succeeded. As for code randomization, our
memory probing abstraction layer provides the same information
to the attacker. Thus, our attacks demonstrate that DCR can be
bypassed even with substantially stronger code randomization than
required by DCR or publicly available for legacy binaries.
Defense limitations. Our defense scheme generates memory
permission bitmaps to (imperfectly) distinguish code and data. Since
these bitmaps are created before code randomization takes place,
they could be invalid at runtime. Thus, we require an interplay
between code randomization and our memory permission bitmaps,
namely that the code randomization updates the bitmaps when
Table 6: Bytes confirmed as code, respectively data, through
dynamic analysis by executing the SPEC benchmark ap-
plications on their test sets. For Firefox’s and Internet Ex-
plorer’s main-libraries, Appendix B shows that roughly 10-
15% code coverage is achievable by visiting 100 popular web-
sites, whereas Section 8.3 shows that roughly 33% can be
achieved by executing popular browser benchmarks. How-
ever, since debug information is available for both browsers,
Table 3 can give accurate numbers for both code and data.
Benchmark Bytes in Confirmed to be
text section Code Data
401.bzip2 93,600 49.54 % 0.10 %
429.mcf 66,184 36.86 % 0.06 %
445.gobmk 603,648 29.77 % 0.77 %
456.hmmer 201,208 24.71 % 0.05 %
458.sjeng 140,320 36.31 % 0.26 %
464.h264ref 463,672 29.94 % 0.05 %
471.omnetpp 606,632 20.45 % 0.03 %
473.astar 94,160 47.27 % 0.07 %
999.specrand 46,192 31.37 % 0.15 %
Table 7: Comparison of DCR, XOM and BGDX.
DCR XOM BGDX
Secure against
Conventional JIT-ROP ✓ ✓ ✓
Code inference attacks ✗ ✓ ✓
Whole-function ROP ✗ ✗ ✓
Qualification criteria
Data reads from code memory ✓ ✗ ✓
Legacy binary support ✓ ✗ ✓
Efficient ✓ ✓ ✓
performing its transformations. To the best of our knowledge, any
randomization technique could be adapted to this requirement.
To hinder whole-function reuse attacks, we randomized the pa-
rameter sequence of functions. This is no problem for internally
used functions, but the parameter sequence of exported functions
cannot be randomized, because all processes use the same parame-
ter sequence to invoke the function. Thus, exported functions are
at risk for whole-function reuse. To tackle this problem, one could
provide separate instances of the shared library for each process.
Lastly, similar to other binary-based security frameworks [2,
49, 50], we do not specifically handle just-in-time (JIT) compiled
code. However, it is easily possible to integrate the JIT-protection
techniques in BGDX: We can use DCR, just as the Heisenbyte
system does [47]. If the JIT-Compiler would provide code and data
bitmaps, we could also provide the stronger protection offered by
our XOM and read-only policies.
Separating Code and Data. Separating code and data is an im-
portant step for disassembly and therefore also for defense schemes
working on binaries. Recent work by Andriesse et al. [4] has shown
that intermingled code and data is, in contrast to the popular opin-
ion, not present in pure-C applications on x86/64, if they are com-
piled with modern GCC or Clang compilers. However, they also
state that it does frequently occur on Windows, due to the MSVC
compiler. It should be noted that the library code is often optimized
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and therefore contains hand-written assembly. Unless the program-
mers take special care to write separation-friendly code, such code
contains intermingled code and data, despite the compiler’s effort.
E. g., the glibc library, which is present in roughly 97% of about
2000 ELF-binaries on a commodity Linux system, grew increasingly
disassembler-friendly over the last versions. As reported by Meng
and Miller [37], glibc contained intermingled code and data as re-
cently as 2016. Furthermore, Andriesse et al. state in a blog post [3]
that both GCC and Clang do not separate code and data on ARM
platforms.
With the widespread use of ARM and glibc, combined with the
fact that an ELF file links, on average, against 10.2 libraries, each
of which may contain hand-written assembly, we think it is fair to
say that separating code from data is still a problem in context of
legacy binaries. In addition, Table 3 shows that roughly 2 % of the
code section in browsers’ main libraries are data bytes—if it were
not for the provided debug information, supporting such complex
binaries would be a struggle for binary-only defense schemes.
10 RELATEDWORK
We have already discussed various code-reuse attacks and defenses
throughout this paper and hence center our discussion on recent
code-reuse attack techniques in the context of DCR protection and
closely related topics.
Extended Code-Reuse Attacks. Counterfeit Object-Oriented
Programming (COOP) [42] describes a powerful attack against C++
applications bypassing many current techniques for control-flow
integrity (CFI). It builds a chain of virtual methods to generate arbi-
trary malicious computation. Crash resistance [19] allows specific
code constructs to probe arbitrary (even unmapped) memory to
disclose randomized code and data sections without crashing the
process. Lastly, the so-called indirect JIT-ROP attack techniques har-
vest code pointers from data sections to infer gadget locations [16].
Only the first two techniques require reading gadgets before uti-
lizing them, but it is not clear, if these attacks can be adapted to
randomized parameter sequences, a challenge we successfully tack-
led in Section 5.
Execute-only Memory. JIT-ROP attacks exploit the fact that
code can be read as data. As a consequence, the concept of execute-
only memory (XOM) was introduced in a tool called XnR [5], which
uses the page-fault handler to distinguish between allowed code
reads for purposes of execution and forbidden code reads, where
code is read as data. HideM [20] uses the translation lookaside buffer
(TLB), which has separate caches for code and data access, to make
the same distinction. Readactor [13] uses a hardware virtualization
scheme to make certain areas of the code memory non-readable.
In addition, it also replaces each code pointer by a pointer to a
trampoline, thereby hiding the actual code pointers and preventing
their leakage in indirect JIT-ROP attacks [16]. Readactor++ [14] en-
hances Readactor with regard to the specifics of C++ to also account
for COOP attacks. Naturally, this pointer indirection increases the
overhead in comparison to pure XOM.
However, XOM-based defenses suffer from a major shortcoming:
they require perfect separation of code and data, as data misclas-
sified as code would lead to loopholes for the attacker and code
misclassified as data results in application crashes. This makes it
very hard to apply XOM for legacy binaries. In fact, XnR requires
source code, Readactor additionally a modified compiler, while
HideM has to sacrifice security for compatibility.
Naturally, every byte protected by DCR rather than XOM poses
an opportunity for the attacker. Nevertheless, our evaluation in
Section 8.3 demonstrates that BGDX achieves almost the same
level of security on legacy binaries than XOM approaches with
byte-granular protection [13, 14] achieve with source code.
Information Hiding. Multiple approaches try to limit the at-
tacker’s capability to locate usable code memory. One example is
Oxymoron [6], which cuts code into single memory pages, and tries
to hide code pointers from one page to another. ASLR-Guard [36]
combines classical shadow stacks with an isolated memory region
for code pointers to hide them. Readactor [13] and its successor [14]
combine XOMwith trampolines to hide code pointers. Code-pointer
integrity hides code pointers in a dedicated safe memory region [33].
Unlike our proposed defense system, all these techniques require
source code and thus cannot protect legacy binaries.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI). Arguably, the problem is not in
reading code memory, but in the diversion from the program’s
planned control flow to execute code of the attacker’s choice. Thus,
control-flow integrity (CFI) aims to prevent such diversion [2].
Modern approaches such as binCFI [53], or CCFIR [52] support
binaries as well. However, their security suffers from imprecise
analysis or coarse-grained policies [22, 42].
Live Randomization. One could also prevent code inference
attacks by repeatedly performing code randomization while the
application executes [21]. This ensures that the discovered gadget
locations are outdated by the time the attacker actually invokes
them. Modern approaches [7, 11, 51] have a low performance over-
head, e. g., by randomizing only after events, which could leak
information. Unlike our defense system, they require source code
or debug symbols, and therefore cannot protect legacy applications.
11 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we show generic attacks that bypass destructive code
read defenses, like Heisenbyte and NEAR. More specifically, we
constructed two different attacks against recent versions of the
popular Firefox web browser (32-bit) and Internet Explorer (64-bit)
protected by DCR. In contrast to prior work, our attacks consider
properly applied, strong load-time code randomization and thus
demonstrate that DCR’s fundamental assumption that one has to
read a gadget in order to execute it, does not hold in practice.
Furthermore, we propose a novel defensive scheme called BGDX
that applies memory permissions on a byte-granular level. BGDX
combines the security benefits of execute-only memory with the
legacy binary compatibility of previous DCR schemes. This defense
has only a small performance overhead and needs only a man-
ageable portion of code marked as execute-only to render code
inference attacks impractical.
In summary, we demonstrate that schemes relying solely on DCR
are conceptually broken, and propose a novel defense to protect
legacy binaries against code inference attacks.
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Figure 6: Cumulative density function of the basic block
sizes in xul.dll (32-bit) and mshtml.dll (64-bit).
Figure 6 shows the sizes of the basic blocks in the main libraries
xul.dll and mshtml.dll for the web browsers Firefox, respec-
tively Internet Explorer. In particular, it gives a cumulative density
function, i. e., it shows that roughly 20 % of the basic blocks in either
library are no larger than five bytes, while basic blocks with ten
bytes or less comprise 50 % of the basic blocks.
B PORTION OF EXECUTED CODE
The attacker may crash the application while probing, since she
cannot predetermine which code she probes and may therefore
accidentally read memory the application later executes. To quan-
tify this risk, we used DynamoRIO [28] to count how often the
basic blocks of the two browsers’ main libraries are executed while
visiting the Alexa Top-100 websites. As Table 8 shows, about 80 %
of the libraries’ code is not executed at all. Taking into account
that (1) an attack takes place after loading a website when most of
the code has already been executed, and (2) that the victim only
needs to visit one website instead of a hundred, only about 1.27 %,
respectively 4.46 %, of the code poses a risk for the attacker. Due to
the high number of gadgets (see Table 3), there are high chances to
find a gadget. Thus, there is a low risk for the attacker to crash the
randomized application.
Table 8: Basic block execution frequencies for the browsers’
main libraries when visiting the Alexa Top-100 websites. Ba-
sic block executions occurring during startup are subtracted,
as they occur before any attack.
#Executed xul.dll (32-bit) mshtml.dll (64-bit)
x = 0 83.27 % 83.77 %
1 ≤ x < 100 15.45 % 11.75 %
x ≥ 100 1.27 % 4.46 %
